When the Threat Has No Face
By Erik Hoffer
The 911 attack created a new reality and a broad-based credible fear in America. The awareness of terrorism has spread from the living room to the boardroom. Business is suddenly acutely aware of terrorism as a major threat to profitability. Before 911 business risk usually dealt with lost sales, not death or destruction. Today, the threats of biologics or explosives infiltrating our plants and offices is real. Media feeds the paranoia but the basis of concern is genuine. Those who were prone to dismiss certain threats to personnel and profits now open their mail with apprehension! Times have changed. In commercial transportation, we have seen passenger inspection reach new heights. It is now common to see a National Guardsman with his M-16 at Newark Airport where just 2 months ago, we would have seen a complacent untrained and typically non-English speaking inspector! The fact that we now have openly addressed the fears of the travelling public is good, but that is merely the first drop in an ocean of need. Clearly every plan to totally eliminate risk falls short. I believe that the people who changed our way of life are somewhat less likely to repeat that game plan. We know they are neither naive nor foolish. We also know that they are well funded and that they have access to weapons of mass destruction. In order to prevent a second attack, we have to think as they do. Preplanning a threat assessment strategy can prevent another tragedy. A repeat of 911 is far less likely by someone but something such as a pallet, sea container, rail car or letter. How do you plan for a threat when the threat is yet undefined and faceless? With the current level of awareness and many physical countermeasures in place, we should not have to concern ourselves with a terrorist easily able to penetrate air, rail or bus security. We should be able to ferret out suspicious types and prevent them from getting on board! The complacency that was pervasive in all forms of transit has now been forever altered. What happens when the threat has no face? How do we offer a level of protection that addresses homeland security when the dynamics of such all-encompassing protection is inconceivable and probably unattainable? The only way to get your hands around this gorilla is to think about each threat independently. One area of real concern is unattended cargo, which moves freely throughout the United States at the rate of over 40 million cargo shipments daily. Just as simple letters were able to quickly penetrate an unsuspecting postal system, so can tainted cargo penetrate an unprepared logistic infrastructure. The supply chain has never had to deal with this level of security and unfortunately they are unprepared. What are we doing about examining unattended cargo entering our borders or being shipped domestically? What can be done to insure a device or biologic does not manage to surreptitiously board a commercial jet or trailer? What scrutiny do we offer our respective companies as cargo receivers, shippers or carriers to insure that tendered cargo is free from contamination or worse? The answer to all is typically nothing. The paranoia against a faceless cargo infiltrator has yet to translate itself into action on the part of government or business. The reason is simple, when the problem appears reaction is immediate, no problem therefore no remedy. Both large and small business run an equal risk as any threat would be random. Some Government agencies have instituted programs requiring driver checking and even reissuing of CDL’s. Hazmat carriers are instituting employee background checks and the FBI has audited trucking companies to do basic vulnerability studies of their business practices and personnel. The FAA has created a “known shipper” program requiring air cargo carriers to know their clients before accepting goods, but little has been done to inspect the cargo itself. Trucking deals in expedited cargo. They have little time to X-ray packages, much less open cargo as an integrity check. Receivers at larger companies that allow cargo on site before checks are made become vulnerable. Ferreting out “bad cargo” among good cargo is all but impossible without some protocol basis of evaluation prior to accepting tendered cargo. Is there a fix? It is obvious that companies naïve to the threat or unwilling to acknowledge it will take no action, as that action comes at a price. Conversely, companies who view the problem as acute may wind up spending resources they could have allocated elsewhere. Overkill in addressing these problems can take its toll on staff, workflow and profits. What is the correct level of risk, and at what threshold should companies seek solutions? Should solutions be physical or protocol based and who should determine the action plan? The answer to all of these questions comes with a simple axiom. Risk planning is a basic fiduciary responsible of employers. The need to facilitate basic levels of protection of your human, intellectual and physical assets is a clear mandate. With even a basic proactive effort to reduce risk in place, your employees and your clients can feel safer and inherently more secure. The system should assess the way you ship and the way you receive cargo and mail. It should attempt to find procedures that offer some level of inspection before unaccompanied cargo gets on your site or picked up by your driver. Any good system should promote physical containment during transit and an inspection template upon delivery. It should create awareness. Whether it is a carrier instituting a preferred client system to a shipper requiring pallet locks, each transportation provider or user needs to be aware that cargo can quickly become a vehicle of destruction. Plan accordingly!

